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Abstract
This study compares the patterns of entry, survival and growth of domestic and foreign
owned rms. We show that the post-entry behavior of foreign owned rms is quite dierent
from that of their domestic counterparts. Among foreign entrants, we were able to distinguish
between those which proceed by creating a new rm and those that acquire an already existing
business. Our evidence reveals that the choice of the mode of entry in foreign markets exerts
an impact upon the performance of rms that persists long after the moment of entry. As a
consequence, our work clearly indicates that there is much to be gained in the understanding
of the process of entry in foreign markets by studying the behavior of entrants over their rst
years in these markets.
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Entry in foreign markets is a central topic in International Business. Among the myriad of
decisions that have to be made by rms operating in foreign markets, entry is certainly the rst,
and perhaps the only one that has to be considered by all rms. It is, therefore, unsurprising that
so much research eort has been devoted to the analysis of entry in foreign markets, as documented
by the inclusion of chapters on entry in two of the major recent books on multinationals (Dunning
1993, Caves 1996).
However, the fact that one of the possible outcomes of the entry process is the exit of the
new venture has been often overlooked. In fact, the analysis of the period subsequent to entry,
including that of the survival of foreign aliates and of their post-entry expansion strategies,
is much scarcer than the analysis of entry. A few recent studies analyzing the survival of new
foreign rms have increased our understanding of this process (Li 1995, Chen and Wu 1996,
Mitchell, Shaver and Yeung 1994, Yamawaki 1997). These studies document that exit is not
only a possible outcome of the entry process but, indeed, a very likely outcome of it. In some
of these studies, the likelihood of survival of rms entering through dierent entry modes has
been analyzed (Li 1995, Yamawaki 1997), but these patterns have not been compared with the
corresponding ows of domestic rms. Li and Guisinger (1991) compared failure rates for foreign
and domestic companies, and found that domestic rms confront higher chances of failure than
their foreign counterparts. Their work did not focus on new rms, however. A separate literature
focusing on the post-entry performance of rms (Audretsch and Mata 1995) also found exit to
be a very likely event among new rms, but this literature did not distinguish rms with respect
to foreignness. Therefore, it seems fair to say that there is a lack of comparative studies of the
post-entry survival of foreign and domestic companies. Studies comparing the post-entry growth
of foreign and domestic rms are even scarcer. Studies on post-entry performance revealed that
rms which manage to survive usually grow in the period subsequent to entry (Dunne, Roberts
and Samuelson 1989, Mata 1994, Barron, West and Hannan 1994, Audretsch 1995). However,
this pattern is not documented for foreign entrants.
This study provides a detailed account of the patterns of entry, survival and post-entry growth
of foreign owned rms which have entered the Portuguese economy during the period 1983-
89. We consider two alternative forms under which foreign entry may occur: greeneld entry,
and acquisition of ongoing rms. We were able to accompany these rms during their rst
years after entry, with the goal of observing their patterns of survival and post-entry evolution.
Besides comparing the characteristics of these two groups of rms with each other, we also make
a comparison with a sample of newly created rms owned by domestic investors.
The theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) suggests a number of reasons why foreign
1rms entering under dierent entry modes may dier, and why they should dier from domestic
companies. This theory and its implications for the post-entry performance of rms is reviewed
in Section 2. Section 3 presents the data source. The empirical analysis comes in Section 4, the
patterns of entry, survival and growth being consecutively presented in subsections 4.1 to 4.3.
The most important ndings are then summarized and put into perspective in Section 5, which
concludes the article.
2 Entry, Survival and Growth: Foreign Aliates and Domestic
Firms
2.1 Entry
Early writers on the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) were concerned with explaining
why it is that some rms engage in transnational operations, despite having an inherent disad-
vantage in operating in foreign markets vis  a vis local rms. This disadvantage stems from the
far greater knowledge that domestic rms possess regarding their local markets and from the ex-
tra costs MNEs must incur in coordinating plants across dierent geographical locations (Hymer
1976). For MNEs to be able to compensate for this disadvantage, they must possess intrinsic
capabilities which give them some sort of competitive advantage over their domestic rivals. These
advantages are usually related to the possession of particular assets which, once developed in one
particular location, can be employed in other locations at no cost or, at least, at a cost which
is lower than the cost of developing it locally. That is, MNEs typically enjoy some degree of
economies of scale in the utilization of these assets, which make them competitive in foreign mar-
kets. These advantages may include nancial advantages, product dierentiation and marketing
advantages, and advantages accruing from economies of common governance or from the ability
to exploit economies of scale at the plant level (Dunning 1993, p. 162-163).
Because not all industries present the same opportunities for exploiting these advantages,
MNEs are not evenly distributed across industries. Summarizing stylized facts about multination-
als, Mark Casson (1987 p. 132) states that they \predominate in industries with high R&D/sales
ratios and high advertising/sales ratios [...] in industries with high ratios of salaried/weekly paid
sta, and of administrative sta/production workers, and with high ve-rm concentration ratios
in the host country.[...] Within an industry, MNEs appear to have the characteristics typical
of the industry, only more so. They undertake more R&D, have a relatively high proportion of
administrative sta, and [...] pay higher wages". Although we know that new rms are not exact
replicas of their older counterparts, we expect the same observed dierences between foreign and
domestic rms to hold between foreign and domestic entrants.
A fair number of the variables identied in the quotation above are commonly associated with
2entry barriers. Indeed, studies on entry by domestic and foreign rms have found that foreign
rms are less responsive to entry barriers than domestic rms (Gorecki 1976, Shapiro 1983), and
Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) found that foreign entrants are even attracted to industries with high
entry barriers. This has been interpreted as an indication that, as a consequence of their stronger
competitive position, foreign entrants are more able to overcome the barriers to entry than are
domestic ones. Our rst hypothesis is, therefore, that
Hypothesis 1) Entry barriers are higher in industries entered by foreign rms than in
those entered by domestic rms.
To the extent that multinationals derive their competitive advantage from the possession of
assets for which the economies of scale are not exhausted within their home country, we may
expect that they should not be exhausted in a small economy such as that of Portugal, either.
Accordingly, we expect foreign entrants to be relatively large. Reasoning along these lines for
Canada, Baldwin (1995 chapter 11) derives the hypothesis that acquisition should be the preferred
method of entry by foreign rms, since in this way the foreign rm does not add capacity to the
market. Consequently, he hypothesizes that acquisition entrants should be larger than foreign
greeneld entrants and these, in turn, should be larger than domestic greeneld entrants.
By the same token, among foreign entrants, acquisition entry is likely to be more frequent
relative to greeneld entry in industries where capacity expansion endangers the position of already
established competitors and attracts aggressive responses. Signicant damages to the position of
incumbents occur with greater probability in industries where economies of scale are important
and where greeneld entry involves a large addition to market capacity. Furthermore, aggressive
reactions from incumbents are more likely to occur in concentrated markets, where coordination
among incumbents is easier. Therefore, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 2) Foreign acquisition entry is more frequent relative to foreign greeneld
entry in industries where economies of scale are more important, and in those having
higher concentration ratios.
Hypothesis 3) Foreign acquisition entrants are larger than foreign greeneld entrants,
and foreign greeneld entrants are larger than domestic greeneld entrants.
A key point of the theory of the MNE is that the rm-specic assets that give rise to the
advantages of MNEs must be dicult both to imitate and to trade. The diculty in imitating
protects rm's rents against competitors and preserves its competitive advantage. The diculty
in selling creates barriers to licensing and forces the rm to engage in transnational operations.
The reason why these advantages are dicult to replicate is because the rm-specic assets in
3which they are based are largely embodied in the rm's knowledge base, often in the form of
tacit knowledge. MNEs tend to perform activities that use knowledge in an intensive manner,
namely, by spending heavily in R&D and advertising. All of these activities, which are crucial
to the development of the rm's ability to innovate and market its products, are associated with
the employment of a better qualied work force. The quotation of Mark Casson above translates
directly into our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4) Foreign entrants pay higher wages and use a better educated labor force
than do domestic rms.
Most studies that have analyzed the eect of business conditions on domestic entry have found
it to be pro-cyclical (Yamawaki 1991, Wagner 1994, Mata 1996). Foreign entry is likely to be
determined by strategic considerations and will not be as responsive to the business cycle as
domestic entry is. Moreover, Caves (1996 p.70) has suggested that foreign entrants should favor
acquisition over greeneld entry when the stock market is depressed, as acquiring assets by means
of buying existing companies may be cheaper than building new plants from scratch. Thus, we
expect acquisitions to follow a counter-cyclical pattern.
Hypothesis 5) Domestic entry is pro-cyclical. Foreign acquisition entry is counter-
cyclical.
2.2 Survival
An unanswered question about foreign entry is whether the ownership advantages possessed by
foreign rms are sucient to compensate for the disadvantages of doing business abroad, and to
what extent foreign and domestic entrants face dierent probabilities of survival.
Economic models of industry evolution (Jovanovic 1982) point out that at the time of entry
rms do not know exactly how ecient they will be in the market. Therefore, during their infancy
in the market they observe their performance and learn about their ability to compete. Those that
discover that they are ecient survive and stay in the market, while those that nd they are not
ecient exit. As time passes and rms age, their initial uncertainty gradually becomes resolved,
and exit grows less likely. Jovanovic's model is sometimes called a model of \passive learning", as
rms are endowed with a given eciency from birth, and just learn about it. Alternative models
proposed by Ericson and Pakes (1995) suggest that rms engage in \active learning" by doing
R&D, that is, they invest in improving their competitive capabilities (see also Nelson and Winter
1982). The spirit of this type of learning is not very dierent from tha which scholars in the
Organizational Ecology tradition call \legitimation" (Hannan and Carroll 1992). These scholars
have emphasized that new organizations suer from a liability of newness, which puts them at a
4competitive disadvantage vis  a vis their older counterparts, and makes their survival less likely.
As organizations age, they develop routines to cope with daily operations and acquire a sense of
\taken-for-grantedness", which reects their increased probability of survival. Empirical ndings
strongly support this \liability of newness" hypothesis (Carroll 1983). This reasoning leads us to
hypothesize that
Hypothesis 6) The probability of exit declines over time.
In our context, one may be interested in distinguishing two levels at which this process of
legitimation (or learning) occurs. In the rst level, rms as a whole are the organizations which
need to be legitimized. At this level, foreign entrants have already developed the procedures and
routines that give rise to legitimation. Because one of the advantages of the MNE is exactly their
managerial ability, they enjoy an advantageous position vis  a vis domestic ones. The second level
is a local one, as rms must also develop routines to deal with their local environment. With
respect to this level, foreign rms that enter by acquiring an ongoing concern are clearly in a
better position than those that start a new rm. Because foreign rms already exist in their
home country before entering the foreign market, they have less to learn from being in the new
market. While this does not necessarily mean that acquisition entrants will be more protable
than greenelds, the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that they are less risky (Caves
1996 p. 70). Moreover, acquisition entrants add to this eect the fact that the acquired rm has
already developed the routines that enable it to deal with its local environment and its learning is
limited to the matching between the acquired rm and the new owners. Therefore, we hypothesize
that
Hypothesis 7) Domestic rms face higher rates of exit than foreign ones. Among these,
greeneld entrants confront higher rates of exit than those entering by acquisition.
2.3 Growth
Studies on the post-entry period have revealed that surviving rms grow quickly during that period
(Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1989, Mata 1994, Barron, West and Hannan 1994, Audretsch
1995). There are several reasons that can explain this pattern. The rst reason is based on
Jovanovic's (1982) idea that rms start with little knowledge about their true capabilities and
use the information recovered from observing their performance in the market to update their
expectations of eciency. Because of this uncertainty, and because of the irreversibility inherent
to most investments, it is optimal for rms to start at a small scale and grow only if they nd that
they performed well in the past (Cabral 1995). A second reason why rms may start small and
5expand afterwards is because their entry size is partially determined by cash constraints. At start-
up rms may nd it dicult to raise enough money to nance entry at their most preferred scale
(Evans and Jovanovic 1989). This is due to the lack of own funds in a sucient amount and to
the diculty in convincing banks that the rm will do well. As rms show good performance over
time, they accumulate internal funds from which they can nance growth, and earn a reputation
with banks, which makes it easier to raise external nance (Brito and Mello 1995). These two
motives for starting small are much more likely to hold in the case of domestic entrants than
in the case of foreign ones. As discussed above, foreign rms will suer less from the liability
of newness and will have less restrictive cash constraints. Due to the larger size of their parent
companies, foreign rms typically have deeper pockets than their domestic competitors, and will
be in a better position to raise funds to nance entry at a large scale (Dunning 1993 p. 150). Due
to their reduced liability of newness, foreign rms (in particular those entering by acquisition) are
likely to have better information about their potential performance at birth, and consequently
are less likely to grow afterwards.
A third reason for starting small and growing afterwards has been suggested in the strategy
literature. By entering at a small scale or in a market niche and subsequently expanding into
other strategic groups, rms may be able to avoid incumbents' aggressive behavior and ease the
process of overcoming entry barriers (Caves and Porter 1977). This strategy is likely to aect
the entry decision of entrants which are not bound to be small due to the two aforementioned
reasons. Thus, foreign entrants that start small are more likely to have chosen their entry scale
based on this type of consideration than domestic entrants. Bogner, Thomas and McGee (1996)
analyzed the entry and post-entry penetration of European rms in the U.S. pharmaceutical
market. They found that not all foreign rms enter the low entry barriers segment. Those that
do enter, however, tend to upgrade their competitive position over time. To the extent that
acquisition is a strategy designed to enter at a large scale, acquisition entry will be more likely
in those cases in which entrants choose to enter close to their desired long-run positions. Thus,
acquisition entrants are less likely to grow quickly than are greeneld entrants. To our knowledge,
the only work that has analyzed the eect of the entry mode on the post-entry growth rate, found
a (weak) negative eect of acquisition upon-post entry growth (Sharma and Kesner 1996). Within
greeneld entrants, while both domestic and foreign are likely to desire to grow after entry, it is
likely that both the nancial and managerial constraints (Penrose 1959) will be more active for
domestic rms. Therefore, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 8) Greeneld foreign entrants experience higher rates of growth than do
domestic entrants, and these experience higher rates of growth than do foreign rms
entering by acquisition.
63 Data
The data used in this paper were obtained from an annual survey which has been conducted by the
Portuguese Ministry of Employment since 1982. Unlike most databases employed in the analysis
of foreign direct investment, our data are not restricted to the largest companies and include
rms of all sizes, as the survey covers all rms employing paid labor in Portugal. We worked
with the original raw data les from 1982 to 1992, which include over 100,000 rms in each year.
Among other data, the survey records the share of equity held by non-residents, which allows
us to compute estimates of the importance of foreign-owned rms in the Portuguese economy.
Moreover, the survey has a longitudinal dimension, i.e. rms are identied by a unique number
which allows rms to be followed over time. All of these characteristics make this data set an
excellent source for studying entry, growth and survival of foreign rms and for comparing these
patterns with those prevailing for domestic companies.
The longitudinal nature of our data and its identication procedures allow us to easily identify
the moments of entry and exit. Identication numbers are assigned to rms sequentially as they
rst report to the survey. This leads directly to the identication of new rms, by comparison of
the rms' numbers with the highest number in the previous year's le. Foreign acquisitions were
identied as those pre-existing rms which became foreign participated from one year to the next.
Finally, the time of exit is found by identifying the moment when rms cease to report to the
survey. Because in such a large data base there are inevitably some coding errors, we performed
some data editing on our les before computing our measures of entry and exit.
To identify foreign entrants we rst located all rms which held foreign capital in at least one
year from 1983 to 1989 and which did not have foreign capital in the previous year. To ensure
that these investments warranted some degree of control over the rms' destinies, we imposed
the additional requisite that the foreign participation be greater than 10%. We found 1033 rms
in these circumstances. We then searched for the existence of the rm itself in the year prior to
entry in order to distinguish greeneld entrants from acquisitions. For doing this, we relied on
the information that rms' identiers are numbers supplied sequentially when rms rst report to
the survey. Identication of new rms can thus be achieved by comparing rms' identiers with
the highest ID number in the le in the previous year. In 613 cases the rm did not exist prior
to the entry of foreign capital, and these rms were identied as being greeneld entrants. In the
remaining 420 cases, the recipient rm was already operating under domestic control before they
received the foreign investment. These were labelled as acquisition entrants. Applying the same
procedure used to identify greeneld entrants to the set of domestically controlled rms, we were
able to locate 123,636 domestic entrants. From this group we selected a random sample of 5,938
rms that was used to make comparisons with our foreign entrants. This sample was stratied
7by year of entry to reect the dierent intensities of rm creation over the period under scrutiny.
To compute our measures of survival we identied the time when rms exit by searching the
les for the rst year the rm ceases to report to the survey. In such a large database there are
inevitably coding errors. To be on the safe side in identifying exit, we required that a rm be
absent from the le for at least two years in order to be classied as a closure. A temporary
exit may occur for a number of reasons other than cessation of activity, a very likely reason
being that the survey form was not received in the Ministry of Employment before the date
when the recording operations were closed. Accordingly, we edited the status of rms which were
temporarily absent from the les for one year. That is, rms that were in the les in years t   1
and t+1 were considered to be active in year t even if they were not actually in the le. The rm's
record was amended for that year, employment being imputed as the average of employment in
years t 1 and t+1. Therefore, for a closure to be recorded in t 1 a rm has to be absent from
the le in t and t + 1. For this reason, in our subsequent analysis we use data only until 1990,
although our data les go until 1992. Data from 1992 is used only to check the presence of the
rm in 1991 and the last year for which we can identify an exit is 1990.
Because our data ends in 1990 for all rms, irrespective of their starting time, it is clear that
the maximum potential age they can reach is quite dierent. Whereas rms from the 1983 cohort
can reach a maximum of eight years of duration, the ones from the 1989 cohort can reach, at
most, two years. An obvious consequence to be kept in mind is that, while the exit rates for the
rst and second years are estimated using data from the seven cohorts, the subsequent rates are
estimated using fewer cohorts. In particular, our estimates for the exit rate after seven years is
produced solely with data from the 1983 and 1984 cohorts. Because of that, we concentrate upon
the evolution until the fth year of life, which we can estimate using ve cohorts of entrants.
Aside from allowing rms to be followed over time, our database permits us to compute a
number of variables which we will use to test the hypotheses formulated above. At the industry
level, we were able to compute the Herndhal index of concentration and the measure of the
minimum ecient scale (MES) suggested by Lyons (1980), which we will use as proxies for entry
barriers. The expected eect of entry barriers is to reduce the ow of entry into the industry.
However, for a given level of entry barriers, industries may experience dierent ows of entry,
depending on their attractiveness. For that reason, we also computed a direct measure of entry
in each industry, dened as the total employment in entrants divided by the total employment
in the industry. Finally, we computed a measure of the foreign presence in the industry, which
is likely to proxy the attractiveness of industries from the foreign rms' perspective. This was
dened as the share of industry employment in foreign owned companies.
At the rm level, we computed measures proxying their size, their human capital and their
8internal organization. The most important shortcoming of our database is perhaps that, because
it was originally designed to collect data on the labor market, the only reliable measure of the
size of rms available is the rms' number of employees. Therefore, rm size is measured here by
employment. To proxy the rm's human capital, we computed the average wage in the rm, and
the proportion of highschool and college graduates among the rm's labor force. We were also able
to measure two dierent aspects of the internal organization of rms. The rst is their legal form.
The second concerns only foreign owned rms. For these rms, we know the share of equity held
by foreigners and, based on this information, we classify foreign rms as fully-owned, majority
joint-ventures and minority joint-ventures. Although we do not develop specic hypotheses with
respect to the internal organization of rms, we will provide a description of our samples with
respect to these characteristics.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Entry
4.1.1 An overview of entry
Table 1 summarizes the information on the total amount of domestic and foreign entry in Portugal
during the period 1983-1989. The rst observation from this table is that foreign entry is by no
means negligible. Although foreign rms represent less than 1% of the total number of rms that
were started in the economy, they account for about 8.6% of the total employment in these rms.
One has to keep in mind that we are not comparing like with like, as foreign rms that entered by
acquisition are not included in the total number of rms created, nor is their employment actually
created. Nevertheless, it is clear that they are quite important in the overall entry ow.
*********************
insert Tables 1 and 2
*********************
Foreign entrants are clearly larger than domestic ones. Foreign greenelds employ, on average,
29 workers, whereas foreign acquisitions employ 98 persons. Overall, they employ an average of
57 persons, that is, ten times as much as domestic entrants. This gure may seem quite modest,
as foreign direct investment and multinational rms are typically identied with large rms. In
fact, Fuita (1995) shows that Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises play only a minor role as
foreign direct investors. However, the size of MNEs and the size of their foreign aliates are two
dierent things. According to the estimates of Dunning (1993 p. 16), while MNEs (that is, rms
possessing foreign aliates) employ on average 2800 persons, the average employment in their
foreign aliates is only about 120 persons.
There are also important dierences among foreign entrants. In particular, note that although
9the number of greeneld entrants exceeds that of acquisition entrants, the employment associated
with acquisition entrants is more than twice the gure associated with greeneld entrants, which
clearly supports our hypothesis that acquisition entrants are larger than foreign greenelds and
these are larger than domestic entrants. Moreover, these two types of entrants also display a
disparate evolution over the cycle (Table 2). The evolution of greeneld entry closely follows that
of domestic entry (correlation of 0.55), which displays a pro-cyclical behavior (correlation with
GDP growth of 0.48), as further analyzed in Mata (1996). In contrast, acquisition entry reaches
its peak during the 1984 downturn, and becomes signicantly less important when domestic and
foreign greeneld entry increases (correlations are -0.33 and -0.56, respectively). Due to the low
number of time series observations, these correlations are not statistically signicant. Nevertheless,
the qualitative results lend some support to our hypothesis that acquisition entry occurs more





Table 3 provides more information on the comparison of domestic and foreign entrants. Panel A
provides a more detailed comparison of the size of entrants. The contrast between the three types
of entrants is very clear. Almost 90% of the domestic entrants employ fewer than 10 persons
when they start, and these very small rms account for nearly one half of the total number of
jobs created by domestic entrants. At the other extreme, there are almost no domestic entrants
employing more than 500 employees. The picture is rather dierent for foreign entrants. For
example, while more than 60% of the total number of greeneld entrants employ fewer than 10
persons, more than one half of total employment is concentrated in rms employing more than
100 persons. The contrast is also striking for foreign rms entering by acquisition. Although
there are some entrants of small size (more than one quarter employ fewer than 10 persons),
they have a negligible impact in terms of employment. Three quarters of total employment is
accounted for by rms having more than 100 persons and over one third by rms employing more
than 500 persons. Statistical tests (allowing for unequal variances), always lead to the rejection
of the equality of the mean start-up sizes for all of the three comparisons (absolute values of t
statistics are 8.0 for comparing domestic and greeneld, 5.6 for domestic and acquisition, and 4.2
for acquisition and greeneld).
Foreign entrants also pay higher wages (Panel B). The average monthly wage paid by foreign
greeneld entrants is about 120% higher than that paid by domestic entrants (t = 19:7), and
the comparison is also favorable for acquisition entrants, which pay on average 102% more than
10domestic ones (t = 18:8). A great deal of these wage dierences is due to the higher education of
the people employed by foreign rms. In fact, Panel C shows that the proportion of people with
college and high school degrees is remarkably higher in foreign owned rms than in domestic ones.
The dierences are also statistically signicant (t = 12:9 and t = 8:1, for comparing domestic with
greenelds and acquisitions, respectively).
The next two panels describe the the organization of rms. Panel D gives the picture in terms
of the legal form adopted by rms. The contrast is very clear between domestic and foreign
rms. While most domestic rms adopt an unlimited liability status, this form is clearly less
frequent among foreign owned companies. The composition of the samples with respect to the
legal structure, was formally compared by means of 2 tests. Their computed values (2
(2) = 1031:3
and 2
(2) = 907:0) clearly lead to the rejection of the hypothesis of equality between domestic and
foreign greenelds and acquisitions. One might perhaps be surprised by the presence of these
unlimited liability rms among foreign owned concerns, as the theories of foreign investment
concentrate their attention on MNEs. However, this is not totally surprising, as for the U.S, for
example, Li and Guisinger (1991) report that 20% of the foreign owned entries in 1981 were held by
foreign individuals, rather than by foreign rms or governments. Moreover, while the preference of
greeneld entrants goes to partnerships, acquisition entrants mostly choose corporations as their
targets (2
(2) = 11:3). Similarly, greeneld entrants are more likely to operate fully-owned business,
while acquisitions tend to have a somewhat greater propensity to adopt minority positions (Panel
E).
4.1.3 The industries entered
Some of the dierences among entrants noted above derive from the fact that they enter dierent
industries. Table 4 compares domestic and foreign entrants with respect to a number of attributes
of the industries they entered. For each type of entrant, the rst column displays the sample's
average for each variable using each rm as an observation, while the second column displays a
weighted average, the weights being rm's employment (all the reported statistical testing was
computed using the unweighted averages). It is very clear that foreign rms enter industries where
concentration is higher (t = 7:1 and t = 7:7 for comparing domestic entrants with greenelds and
acquisitions, respectively), where the minimum ecient scale is larger (t = 5:1 and t = 5:9),
and where the previous foreign presence is more important (t = 16:3 and t = 13:8). For all of
these variables, the contrast is even greater for acquisition than for greeneld entrants. However,
although acquisition entrants clearly enter industries where the intensity of entry is lower (t =
17:4), the result is not entirely conclusive for the comparison between domestic and foreign rms
entering by greeneld entry. Domestic rms enter industries where entry rates are higher (t = 2:7).
However, by computing the averages using employment rather than the number of rms, one is
11led to the conclusion that industries entered by foreign greeneld entrants are characterized by
higher entry rates than those entered by domestic rms (t = 13:5). These results arise because





We have previously seen that our three types of entrants dier widely with respect to a
number of characteristics, and we have now seen that these rms enter industries having dierent
characteristics. Now, we move on to analyze the extent to which the observed characteristics of the
dierent types of entrants remain after having controlled for these sectoral patterns of entry. The
statistical methodology has to be dierent, depending on the nature of the variable to be analyzed.
For the ratio-scale variables (rm start-up size, and wages), we employ a conventional regression
approach, including 345 dummies for the ve-digit industries, plus two additional dummies to
discriminate between entry types. When the dependent variable is the proportion of college
graduates in the labor force, we employ a logit model with the same independent variables as
above. In both cases, we are concerned with the magnitude of the coecients for the dummies
associated with entry type and their statistical signicance.
Table 5 reports the results. The rst column reports the results of the comparison without
industry eects, while the second column reports the same comparison after taking the industry
eects into account. It is quite clear that the same qualitative results hold after taking industry
into account. The entry type coecients are somewhat reduced, but they remain highly signicant,
both economically and statistically. Greeneld entrants employ 23 more persons than do domestic
entrants, the dierence between the average employment in acquisition entrants and domestic
entrants being 92. Controlling for the eect of industry heterogeneity, these dierences are reduced




The probability that a person employed by a foreign rm holds a college degree is also higher
than the corresponding probability for individuals employed by a domestic rm. Within foreign
entrants, this probability is higher for greeneld entrants. The estimated coecients do not have
a direct interpretation due to the non-linearities of the model, but a useful statistic (the odds
ratio) can easily be derived. The odds ratio, that is, the ratio between the probabilities that
one individual working for a foreign and for domestic rm holds a college degree, is given by the
12exponential of the estimated coecient in the logit model. Our estimates in Table 5 imply that
it is 11 times (6 times) more likely that a person employed by a foreign greeneld (acquisition)
entrant holds a college degree than an individual employed in a domestic rm. After controlling
for industry eects, these gures are reduced to 7 and 4 times, respectively. Finally, the estimates
for wages indicate that foreign entrants pay salaries which are much higher than domestic ones.
From the estimated coecients, it is easy to derive estimates of the increase in wages paid by
foreign greeneld and acquisition entrants relative to domestic entrants, respectively (these are
simply the exponential of the coecient estimates minus one). Without controlling for industry
eects, our models estimate that greenelds pay 102% and acquisitions 93% more than do domestic
entrants. Controlling for industries these gures come down a good deal (being only 64% and
58%, respectively), but remain quite signicant. That is, even after taking into account that
foreign and domestic rms enter dierent industries, there remain substantial dierences in rm
start-up size, wages and education of the work force in domestic, foreign greeneld and foreign
acquisition entrants.
4.2 Survival
A signicant number of entrants exit during the rst years of life. Table 6 presents the survival
rates and the hazard rates for the three types of entrants. The survival rate gives the probability
that a rm from the initial pool of entrants survives until a given age. The hazard rate gives the
probability that a rm that was active in the beginning of a given year exits during the course of
that year. The survival rate is useful for analyzing what has happened since entry until a given
moment. The hazard rate is useful for analyzing exit during a short period.
Table 6 shows that almost one fourth of the domestic entrants exit during the rst year of
operations, while the corresponding gure for foreign entrants is slightly over 10% and 4% for
greenelds and acquisitions, respectively. After ve years of life, less than one half of the initial
pool of domestic entrants remain active, while more than two thirds and more than four fths of
the foreign greeneld and acquisition entrants are still in operation.
*********************
insert Tables 6 and 7
*********************
The same ranking as above applies to the hazard rates. Acquisition entrants experience the
lowest and domestic entrants the highest probabilities of exit in almost all periods. Moreover, a
dierence emerges in the comparison between rms that were newly created (domestic and foreign)
and acquisition entrants. While the rst group of rms experiences a signicant decrease in the
exit probability from the rst to the second year, perhaps owing to some liability of newness, no
13such pattern is visible for acquisition entrants. An easy way to compute a formal test on the time
pattern of exit and to assess whether the decline in the hazard rates is statistically signicant is
to regress (by weighted least squares) the log of the hazard rates on a constant and on the log of
age (Gehan and Siddiqui 1973). This procedure amounts to assuming that the longevity of rms
follows a Weibull distribution, the coecient associated with the log of age being an estimate of
the Weibull parameter. Negative (positive) values of this parameter indicate negative (positive)
duration dependence, that is, they indicate a decreasing (increasing) hazard rate over time. The
estimated coecients, while being negative for all groups, are signicantly dierent from zero at
all the conventional levels for domestic entrants (t = 8:7), at the 10% level for foreign greeneld
entrants (t = 2:4), but clearly not signicant for acquisition entrants (t = 0:2).
Again, one may want to know whether the dierences in survival hold after taking into account
the fact that rms enter dierent industries. Table 7 displays the results of estimating a logit
model, where the dependent variable is 1 if the rm is still operating ve years after entry and 0 if
it exited. In the rst specication, the independent variables are the two dummies discriminating
between entry types. In the second specication, the 345 industry dummies are also included. In
the model including industry eects, the estimate of the coecients associated with the foreign
dummies show a slight decrease relative to the models without industry dummies. However, they
remain highly signicant, and the relative odds ratio changes only from 2.6 to 2.4 in the case of
greenelds and from 5.8 to 5.6 in the case of acquisitions.
4.3 Post-Entry Growth
Those rms that manage to survive grow in the post-entry period, as shown in Table 8. This table
shows the size and growth of rms over the rst years of their lives. For each type of entrant two
measures of growth are shown. The rst measure (Firm Growth) is the average of the growth rates
of rms in the sample. Each rm is weighted equally in this average. The second (Employment
Growth) is the growth rate of total employment in rms in the sample. This rate is a weighted
rate of growth, the weights being rm size in the beginning of the period.
*********************
insert Tables 8 and 9
*********************
Three results emerge from this table. The rst is that rms grow over their lives. This holds
for all of our entry types. The second is that the unweighted growth rate is generally larger than
the weighted rate. This indicates that growth comes primarily from small rms, a result which is
well recognized in the literature that has analyzed the growth of rms (e.g., Evans 1987). However,
a third result that emerges from Table 8 is that foreign greeneld entrants grow much faster than
14domestic entrants, despite being much larger than them, as we have previously seen. This clearly
indicates that they are, indeed, subject to very dierent dynamics, as we have hypothesized.
We can go one step further, and compare the evolution of total employment for each type of
entrant. At the fth year, for example, total employment in domestic entrants has decreased by
8% of the total number of people employed by the original set of entrants. In contrast, during the
same period the employment in greeneld entrants has increased 100% whereas for acquisition
entrants the corresponding gure is 15%. These gures reect the joint inuence of both the
survival rate and the rate of expansion of the average rm. Whereas survivability dominates the
evolution of employment for domestic entrants, post-entry growth is determinant in the case of
foreign entrants and, in particular, for greeneld ones.
In Table 8 only those rms that survive in each year can be included in the computations.
Therefore, in each row a dierent sample is being analyzed, which may render the comparison
misleading. This is very clear, for example, with acquisition entrants at the seventh year, when
the size of rms increased, despite growth rates of employment being negative. To control for this
sample selection eect, and to isolate the growth of survivors, Table 9 presents the same statistics
computed for a constant sample of rms that survived during the rst ve years after entry. It is
clear from this table, that the previous results were not simply produced by the sample selection




Finally, Table 10 summarizes the process of growth. It is very clear that foreign greeneld
entrants are those which experience the highest growth rate. This result still holds after controlling
for industry aliation. On the contrary, the growth rate of acquisition entrants is estimated to
be lower than that of domestic entrants, but the dierence is never statistically signicant.
5 Discussion and conclusion
During the course of this article, we have made a close examination of the process of entry, survival
and post-entry growth of foreign and domestic rms. In the remainder of this nal section, we
put these results into perspective and highlight some promising avenues for future research, which
emerge directly from this work.
Our main conclusion is that entrants dier in a number of important aspects. Domestic
entrants are typically much smaller than foreign ones, pay lower wages, employ a less educated
labor force, and adopt simpler legal forms. Foreign and domestic rms also have dierent sectoral
entry patterns. In particular, foreign rms enter industries where the previous presence of foreign
15rms is signicantly more important and where entry barriers are higher (larger economies of
scale and greater concentration) than in those entered by domestic entrants. All of these results
comparing domestic and foreign entrants hold irrespectively of whether foreign entry comes about
through the acquisition of an existing rm or through the formation of a new company. These
ndings are in accordance with the conventional wisdom provided by the literature on entry that
the protection oered by entry barriers is selective, and that the most favored entrants are less
likely to be deterred by entry barriers (Geroski 1995). With respect to the actual ows of entry,
however, the contrast seems to be more signicant between newly created rms (both foreign
and domestic) and acquisition entrants, that is, already existing rms which were acquired by
foreign owners. Industries entered by foreign acquisition entrants experience lower actual entry
ows than industries entered by both domestic and foreign greeneld entrants.
There are also important dierences in the post-entry performance of the dierent types of
entrants. Domestic entrants are much more likely to exit than are foreign ones, both greeneld
and acquisition, a result that agrees with the ndings of Li and Guisinger (1991). With respect
to post-entry growth, however, a mixed pattern emerges. Foreign acquisition entrants grow very
little, foreign greenelds grow very quickly, and domestic entrants are in between. These two
patterns of exit and growth combine to produce very distinctive patterns for the overall evolution
of employment among entrants over time. While the aggregate employment of domestic entrants
decreases over time, foreign entrants employ more and more people as they mature. In the case
of foreign greeneld entrants, this is particularly signicant. In our sample, after ve years in the
market, they employ twice as many people as they did at start-up. Due to data limitations, we
were not able to investigate how these patterns may translate into the conquest of market share
and protability, but this denitely remains a point to be pursued in future research.
There are also other sharp dierences among foreign entrants. Greeneld entry is more impor-
tant when macroeconomic conditions are more favorable, while acquisition entry increases during
recessions. In many cases, these two modes of foreign market entry are alternatives considered by
prospective entrants, and small changes in their relative costs and payos may shift the preferred
option from one to the other alternative. Our ndings show that when the overall macroeco-
nomic conditions worsen and prices fall in the market for rms, acquisition entry becomes more
attractive relative to greeneld entry. Moreover, foreign greeneld entrants are more likely to
be started in industries where concentration and scale economies are of lesser importance. They
are also smaller at start-up, and experience higher failure rates than acquisition entrants. How-
ever, as previously mentioned, those foreign greeneld rms that survive grow much faster than
the corresponding acquisition entrants. This suggests that greeneld entry is more risky than
acquisition, but that it also has higher returns, which conforms well to previous ndings. For
16example, Woodcock, Beamish and Makimo (1994) found that the performance of foreign rms
entering via the creation of new ventures stabilizes latter in time than that of those rms entering
by acquisition. They also found that new ventures experience a higher increase in performance
over time than that experienced by acquisition entrants. Previous work examining the post-entry
growth of entrants has also found that rms which were newly created grow faster than those
which entered by acquiring an already existing business (Sharma and Kesner 1996). Similarly,
establishments created by new rms were found to grow faster than those which were created
by ongoing rms (Mata, Portugal and Guimar~ aes 1995). These ndings are, however, somewhat
weaker than our own. As these studies did not distinguish between domestic and foreign owned
entrants, this seems to indicate that the contrast is even stronger among foreign owned rms
than among domestic rms. A possible explanation for this contrast is that foreign owned rms
typically have deeper pockets than domestic ones, and thus experience less cash constraints in
nancing the growth of their subsidiaries. One of the limitations of our data base is that we do
not know the identity of the foreign owners, and we could not pursue this line of investigation.
Future work that could match the foreign parents with their subsidiaries, may have an important
research question to investigate.
All of these results lend some support to a view that sees the choice of the entry mode as
resulting from the balance between conicting forces. On the one hand, greeneld entry entails
greater costs. First of all, new businesses typically have to learn about the environment and
develop routines which enable them to deal eectively with it. On the contrary, established
organizations have already gone through this period of trial and learning. Second, by creating
new productive facilities and adding new capacity to the market, entrants may provoke aggressive
responses from incumbents. When economies of scale are large, and entry has to be carried out
at large scale, or when concentration is high, and aggressive reactions are more likely, acquisition
tends to be the preferred mode of entry. On the other hand, greeneld entry also has greater
benets, as the whole rm can be designed in order to suit the foreign owner. If, for example,
the ownership advantages of the parent rm rest on technology, the installed machinery of an
already operating rm may have little value for the buyer. If the advantages rest on organizational
superiority, part of the routines developed by established organizations may be of very little use to
the foreign entrant. It may thus be dicult to nd an ongoing rm that is suitable for acquisition,
and greeneld entry may be the only viable alternative. This suggests that foreign entrants favor
greeneld entry over acquisition when the ownership advantages of the parent company are of the
utmost importance. This conclusion is consistent with our ndings that greeneld entrants employ
a more skilled labor force and are less likely to operate joint-ventures than are acquisition entrants.
Employing a more skilled labor force, they are in a better position to exploit the superiority of
17rm-specic assets. On the other hand, due to the importance of their rm-specic assets, their
contribution towards the value of rms increases relative to that of other potential partners. This
makes them less likely to be willing to operate joint-ventures and share its prots, as found by
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Agarwal and Rammaswami (1992).
Our results clearly indicate that greeneld entrants do not enter at a small scale because they
want to remain small in the long run. Rather, they suggest that greeneld and acquisition entry
are two alternative entry methods that can be used by foreign rms to avoid bearing all the
burden of entry barriers at once. The rst one is to acquire (often partially) an ongoing rm
and \join the club" of incumbents. The second one is to start a relatively small rm, with the
goal of growing and upgrading its position afterwards. This view ts well the ndings of Bogner,
Thomas and McGee (1996) where European rms that entered the U.S. pharmaceuticals market
in the low entry barriers segment have rapidly improved their competitive position.
In summary, entry is only the rst step of a process that continues over the rst years of the
entrants' lives. Therefore, analyzing the post-entry period is a crucial step in order to gain a more
comprehensive view of the entry process. Some recent work has already looked at the patterns of
post-entry survival of foreign entrants but neglected other aspects of performance (Li 1995, Chen
and Wu 1996, Mitchell, Shaver and Yeung 1994, Yamawaki 1997). Other work has focused on
comparing nancial performance of foreign and domestic entrants, but paid little attention to the
issue of selection and survival (Woodcock, Beamish and Makimo 1994), and virtually no work has
analyzed the growth of foreign subsidiaries.
In this paper, we have given a rst account of the process of entry, survival, and growth by
foreign rms, but there is much work that remains to be done. In particular, we would benet
from knowing in what manner the post-entry strategies interact with the choice of entry mode,
and what the role of post-entry market learning may be in shaping the success of foreign market
entry. One important implication of our work is to emphasize that entry and post-entry market
penetration are two sides of the same coin, and to highlight the importance of focusing on the post-
entry period, rather than on the entry moment alone. Hopefully, future research on foreign market
entry will take this perspective into consideration, and will develop a comprehensive framework
to analyze entry and post-entry performance.
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20Table 1: Entry by Domestic and Foreign Firms
Domestic Foreign
Greenfield Acquisition
Firms   123636 613 420
Employment  689920 17582 41171
Firm Size   5.6 28.7 98.0
Table 2: Time Patterns of Entry
Domestic Foreign
Year Greenfield Acquisition
Firms Employment                Firms Employment           Firms Employment
1983 12.6% 15.6% 18.1% 21.4% 4.5% 8.6%
1984 10.7% 11.4% 11.1% 11.4% 25.5% 42.6%
1985 9.8% 11.1% 9.3% 9.8% 24.8% 19.4%
1986 12.7% 11.7% 13.9% 15.4% 3.8% 5.4%
1987 15.2% 14.4% 9.5% 6.1% 11.0% 8.1%
1988 18.3% 18.6% 19.1% 17.4% 11.2% 4.1%
1989 20.8% 17.1% 19.1% 18.6% 19.3% 11.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%Table 3: Characterization of Entrants
Domestic Foreign
Greenfield Acquisition
Panel A: Size Firms Employment Firms Employment Firms Employment
1-9 88.6% 47.1% 60.0% 7.9% 26.0% 1.3%
10-49 10.3% 33.0% 28.2% 21.3% 36.7% 9.3%
50-99 0.7% 8.7% 4.2% 10.4% 15.7% 11.4%
100-499 0.3% 9.1% 6.9% 46.5% 19.3% 45.0%
500+ 0.0% 2.1% 0.7% 13.9% 2.4% 33.1%
Panel B: Wages
Average Wage 14.1 16.1 31.1 26.6 28.6 29.1
Panel C: Schooling
College  1.3% 1.4% 13.1% 4.3% 7.5% 3.5%
High School  16.8% 15.1% 43.3% 28.5% 33.3% 24.9%
Basic School or Less 81.9% 83.5% 43.6% 67.2% 59.2% 71.6%
Panel D:Establishments
1 97.6% 87.7% 91.4% 66.8% 71.0% 37.7%
2 1.9% 7.5% 5.2% 10.9% 15.7% 29.6%
3-9 0.4% 4.5% 2.6% 14.0% 10.5% 21.7%
10+ 0.0% 0.3% 0.8% 8.3% 2.9% 11.0%
Panel E: Legal Form
Unlimited 56.9% 36.7% 7.3% 5.4% 8.6% 4.7%
Partnership 42.3% 57.9% 78.3% 73.4% 21.2% 46.1%
Corporation 0.7% 5.4% 14.4% 21.2% 70.2% 49.2%
Panel F: Foreign Control
Minority 17.9% 17.5% 24.8% 39.5%
Majority 32.6% 24.5% 31.9% 26.4%
Fully-Owned  49.4% 58.0% 43.3% 34.1%Table 4:Industry Characteristics
Domestic Foreign
Industry Variables Greenfield Acquisition
Entries Employment Entries Employment Entries Employment
Entry Rate 9.59% 9.10% 8.55% 9.99% 5.53% 3.59%
Foreign Presence 3.84% 7.14% 14.60% 17.67% 16.39% 27.55%
Concentration 0.012 0.020 0.045 0.055 0.058 0.104
MES 39.45 55.76 66.57
Table 5: Comparison of Firm Characteristics by Type of Entrant (n=6971)
Without Industry Controls With Industry Controls















* Standard errors in parenthesisTable 6: Time Patterns of Survival
Domestic Foreign
Age Greenfield Acquisition
Survival Rate Hazard Rate Survival Rate Hazard Rate Survival Rate Hazard Rate
0 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 0.787 0.238 0.892 0.108 0.960 0.041
2 0.678 0.139 0.834 0.066 0.915 0.046
3 0.582 0.141 0.776 0.069 0.890 0.027
4 0.516 0.114 0.728 0.063 0.851 0.044
5 0.462 0.104 0.671 0.078 0.831 0.024
6 0.415 0.102 0.635 0.053 0.794 0.045
7 0.372 0.105 0.590 0.071 0.731 0.079
Table 7: Comparison of Survival by Type of Entrant (n=4287)










Size Growth Size Growth Size Growth
0 5.7 28.7 98.0
1 6.8 22.5% 40.5 92.9% 109.1 29.3%
2 7.8 15.9% 51.7 36.9% 107.3 6.6%
3 8.6 11.2% 58.8 14.4% 109.9 7.3%
4 9.8 10.8% 70.6 9.8% 122.7 20.1%
5 11.4 7.7% 85.6 21.3% 136.0 5.9%
6 12.3 5.8% 88.9 5.1% 137.7 2.5%
7 13.3 6.7% 79.0 7.7% 139.9 -0.7%




Size Growth Size Growth Size Growth
1 8.5 24.0% 45.0 111.6% 132.9 11.1%
2 9.5 22.5% 63.1 44.8% 124.2 5.3%
3 10.1 16.0% 70.1 20.1% 129.5 9.1%
4 10.8 12.1% 79.1 13.6% 134.1 24.4%
5 11.4 7.7% 85.6 21.3% 136.0 5.9%
Table 10: Comparison of Firm Growth, by Type of Entrants (n=2283)
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